[Ciclo de conferências] Perceptual Content and Singular Thought

1º Encontro
Dr. Santiago Echeveri
Investigador Associado Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas UniversidadNacionalAutónomadeMéxico

Iconic Object Representations

Abstract. Philosophers and cognitive scientists often understand ‘perceptual object’ as any entity that can be segmented from its surroundings, bound properties to, and tracked over time. A prominent view holds that perceptual object representations are mental demonstratives. In this paper, I present an explanatory argument against the ‘demonstrative view’ and in favor of what I call the ‘iconic view’. The first part of the argument shows that (traditional) demonstratives do not make available information used in segmentation. Still, information used in segmentation is necessary to explain visual tracking. Therefore, the demonstrative view does not explain visual tracking. The second part of the argument shows that information used in segmentation can be made available by iconic representations, roughly, representations analogous to pictures and maps. Therefore, the iconic view can, while the demonstrative view cannot, explain visual tracking. This explanatory argument is significant because visual tracking has been taken to offer the best evidence in favor of the demonstrative view.

Inscrições: mlcogusp@gmail.com

Coordenação: Prof. João Vergílio Gallerani Cuter
Organização: Mind, Language and Cognition Group